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More than twenty years ago, many countries around the world engaged into economic reform programs that 
seek to establish an active private sector, i.e. privatization. 
The purpose of this reform is to decrease government con-
trol in the economy, and to transfer resources and owner-
ship from the state to private investors. The inefficiencies 
of state-owned enterprises that were the principal impetus 
for privatization were largely due, according to Shleifer 
(1998), to the political objectives pursued by the govern-
ment officials and bureaucrats that were managing these 
firms. Privatization then spread worldwide as economic 
globalization and markets integration increased. Indeed, 
the deeper international competition, the liberalization of 
stock markets worldwide and the lift of trade barriers across 
countries helped strengthen the need to develop and foster 
private sector activities, leading to an international shift 
towards private sector development. 
The pace of the privatization process has been both 
sustained and global, in both developing and developed 
countries, and still shows no signs of slowing down, 
particularly in developing countries, even though more 
than two decades elapsed from its start (World Bank, 
2006). When countries engaged in economic policies 
favouring private ownership, they simultaneously attracted 
much attention from foreign investors, particularly from 
multinational corporations, in the form of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). This is especially true for developing 
countries. The World Bank (2003) notes, for instance, that 
FDI has become the largest and most resilient form of 
capital flows, especially for developing countries. Some 
studies sustain that privatization was instrumental in the 
FDI growth observed worldwide. For example, Baer (1994) 
notes that privatization had an impact on foreign investments 
in many Latin American countries, as he documents that 
Résumé
Cet article examine le lien entre l’investis-
sement direct à l’étranger (IDÉ) et la priva-
tisation des entreprises étatiques. Nous 
faisons l’hypothèse que la privatisation 
affecte l’IDÉ dans la mesure où la partici-
pation du secteur privé s’accompagne sou-
vent de mesures de libéralisation et de 
l’allocation d’actions des entreprises nou-
vellement privatisées  à des investisseurs 
étrangers. De même, nous prévoyons  que 
l’IDÉ favorise la privatisation dans la 
mesure où les entrées de capitaux, la tech-
nologique, et les habiletés de gestion qui 
accompagnent l’IDÉ créent un environne-
ment plus compétitif et plus  propice à la 
privatisation d’entreprises inefficaces. Nos 
résultats tendent à confirmer nos hypothè-
ses.
Mots clés : privatisation, investissement 
direct à l’étranger, relation bidirection-
nelle.
AbstRAct
This article examines the link between for-
eign direct investment (FDI) and privatiza-
tion of state-owned enterprises. We 
hypothesize that privatization has an effect 
on FDI as the process of fostering private 
sector participation is often accompanied 
by liberalization measures, and by allocat-
ing the shares of newly privatized firms to 
foreign investors. Similarly, we expect FDI 
to foster privatization efforts as capital 
inflows, technology and managerial skills 
that accompany FDI make the environment 
more prone to competition, and provide 
governments with a good environment to 
privatize inefficient firms. Our results pro-
vide support for our conjectures.
Keywords: privatization, foreign direct 
investment, bi-directional relation.
Resumen
Este artículo examina la relación entre la 
inversión directa en el extranjero (IDE) y 
la privatización de empresas estatales. 
Nuestra hipótesis es que la privatización 
afecta la IDE en la medida en que la parti-
cipación del sector privado con frecuencia 
va acompañada  por medidas de liberaliza-
ción y de adjudiación de acciones de 
empresas recientemente privatizadas a 
inversores extranjeros. De la misma 
manera, suponemos  que  la IDE  favorece 
la privatización en la medida en que la 
afluencia de capitales, la tecnología y las 
habilidades de gestión asociadas a la IDE 
crean un entorno más competitivo y propi-
cio a la privatización de empresas inefica-
ces. Los resultados obtenidos tienen a 
confirmar nuestras hipótesis.
Palabras claves: privatización, inversión 
directa en el extranjero, relación bidireccio-
nal.
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the presence of foreign capital has increased as the extent 
of involvement of the state in the economy declined. Other 
arguments in the literature hold that privatization, often 
accompanied with a combination of other reform measures 
that aim to improve the investment climate, lift barriers to 
trade and provide a better and more effective institutional 
environment, contributed to the rise in FDI flows over the 
last twenty years.
Like privatization, FDI has made significant progress 
around the world. The rising trend in FDI in several regions 
around the globe appears in several World Bank reports. 
Particularly, the World Bank (2002) reports that FDI has 
positively responded to government implementations of 
privatization programs, and notes that seven of the ten largest 
FDI recipients received more than $US1 billion from foreign 
investors to participate in the privatization transactions that 
were conducted in 1999. The intensity of the privatization 
program seems to be strengthened by massive increases 
in FDI flows which continued to increase throughout the 
2000s. FDI brings about many benefits ranging from fund-
raising, new technologies, improvements in human capital, 
new managerial skills and improved corporate governance. 
It is thus no surprise that several privatization transactions 
on the stock market involved the sale of a tranche directly 
aimed at foreign investors. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the link 
between these phenomena by investigating whether 
privatization is a determinant of FDI, and whether FDI 
enhanced and contributed to the sustainability of the 
privatization process. More specifically, we seek to provide 
answers to the following questions: how does privatization 
affect FDI? How do both interact? The use of international 
data from developed and developing economies allows us 
provide new evidence and draw several novel insights and 
policy implications. 
The empirical analysis of the role of privatization 
in determining FDI, and the role of FDI in affecting 
privatization is important for several reasons. First, FDI 
flows are an engine for future economic growth and 
institutional development. Examining the role of specific 
economic reforms as a determinant of FDI is thus important 
for policy purposes. Second, assessing the link between a 
redistributive (often opposed) policy such as privatization, 
and an equally controversial phenomenon, such as FDI, 
is important on theoretical grounds. Several governments 
faced riots and social opposition as they were engaging in 
privatization reforms, further fuelled by the announcement 
that the potential buyers were foreign. Previous studies 
have examined the link between foreign participation and 
postprivatization firm performance (Boubakri, Cosset, 
Guedhami, 2005). However, at the macro-economic level, 
whether FDI and privatization are mutual determinants 
remains an issue to explore.
Why, beyond the anecdotal evidence described above, 
should privatization and FDI be related? Several potential 
channels can be put forward. First, privatization usually 
improves the investment climate thus making investment 
more attractive for investors, domestic and foreign alike, 
and contributes to enhance the growth and development 
process. For instance, a recent study by Boubakri, Cosset 
and Smaoui (2007) shows that privatization contributes 
to the improvement in the overall institutional quality 
of the country –i.e., its rule of law and law enforcement 
mechanisms. Second, while the effect of privatization on 
growth remains yet to be assessed, available evidence from 
countries that pursued privatization does reveal significant 
positive outcomes, especially at the firm level (see 
Megginson and Netter, 2001, for an extensive review of the 
literature). Finally, within the context of private risk taking, 
privatization should reinforce the globalization phenomenon 
as privatization, through share issues, has a positive impact 
on financial market developments and drains FDI. Parallel 
to this effect, we also argue that more financially open 
economies are more likely to privatize extensively. These 
mechanisms of transmission between FDI and privatization 
have been unexplored to date. Thus, privatization, defined as 
the process by which the government transfers state-owned 
firms to the private sector, and FDI are two concomitant, 
reinforcing mechanisms, although, to date, they have been 
treated in two separate strands of literature: the privatization 
literature has focused on the outcome of the reform on 
several aspects, such as the performance of newly privatized 
firms, corporate governance, legal institutions, stock market 
liquidity, etc,...(e.g., D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Perotti 
and van Oijen, 2001; Bortolotti, de Jong, Nicodano and 
Schindele, 2004; Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami, 2005). 
The FDI literature has instead focused on its impact on 
economic growth and welfare, and social inequality (e.g., 
Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee, 1998; Morley, 2001; 
Noorbakhsch, Paloni and Youssef, 2001; Aitken, Harrison 
and Lipsey, 2001; Khawar, 2005). 
Using a sample of 22 developed and 31 developing 
countries, over the period 1984 to 2005, we implement 
a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach in a 
dynamic panel context and find support for our conjecture. 
Indeed, controlling for several factors shown in the 
literature to affect the decision to privatize, we find that FDI 
flows have a positive effect on privatization proceeds and 
on the privatization method. We also find that privatization 
proceeds (but not the privatization method) influence the 
extent of FDI in a country, suggesting that both FDI flows 
and privatization are interrelated. Our results suggest that 
privatization can be instrumental in attracting FDI, which 
can contribute to domestic economic growth. By the same 
token, privatization constitutes a credible signal of less 
policy risk for foreign investors, and contributes to attract 
more FDI. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 presents some stylized facts on FDI and privatization. 
Section 3 discusses the empirical approach, the sample 
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and variables. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and 
discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
Stylized facts and the review of the literature
Recent figures given by the World Bank (2006) show that 
FDI flows continue to expand. FDI inflows to developing 
countries reached a record $325 billion in 2006. The 
industry composition of FDI shows that FDI is particularly 
important in banking, and telecommunications, these sectors 
being under intensive privatization activities. The trend has 
been supported by the relaxation of restrictions on foreign 
ownership and by major privatization transactions. Most 
of the 10 largest privatizations, mergers and acquisitions 
in 2006 occurred in the banking and telecommunications 
sectors. 
Recent figures from the World Bank privatization 
database suggests that the global privatization trends also 
show a regain of momentum in 2004-2005. In the last 
two decades, 44 countries carried out 4 580 transactions 
(1 437 transactions in 25 developing countries, and 3 143 
transactions in 19 developed countries). In the 1990s, 
privatization proceeds in developing countries averaged 
between $20 to 30 billion on an annual basis. Proceeds 
peaked sharply in 1997 to almost $90 billion. Revenues 
declined thereafter following the East Asian financial crisis 
of 1997 and the Russian debt crisis of 1998. But, by 2000, 
the privatization activity has exceeded its 1990 level, and 
soon picked up until today. Furthermore, in developed and 
developing countries, the average value of transactions 
increased over time as larger companies were put for sale to 
reach $96 million in 2003. 
The literature on privatization suggests that domestic 
economic conditions influence the government’s decision 
to privatize, and the way it structures privatization. For 
instance, governments facing budget deficits, or fiscal 
crises are more likely to undertake privatization. Also, 
Megginson, Nash, Netter and Poulsen (2004) argue that 
countries with higher deficits, among other variables, are 
more likely to privatize state-owned assets by share issue 
privatizations (SIPs) than by private sales. However, 
Boubakri, Cosset, Guedhami and Omran (2007) show that 
whether privatization is implemented by SIPs or private 
sales in developing countries, foreign direct investment was 
omnipresent (foreign investors thus participated in 86% 
of privatization transactions between 1980 and 1999 in 
developing countries). Other determinants of privatization 
have been identified in the literature (e.g., Bortolotti, 
Fantini and Siniscalco, 2003; Megginson, Nash, Netter 
and Poulsen, 2004): For example, the political orientation 
of the government is important as right-wing governments 
are more likely to privatize than left-wing governments. In 
addition, a financial distressed government is more likely to 
privatize while countries with lower protection and a weak 
legal environment are less likely to privatize. 
FDI can be an additional potential determinant of 
privatization. Since FDI enhances the competitiveness of 
the domestic economy, contributes to more skilled labour, 
helps to import new technology, it has a positive externality 
on the environment. Thus, governments will have more 
incentives to privatize if the economy is more open to 
foreign investment. Furthermore, regarding the benefits 
of privatization through FDI, there is a general agreement 
that foreign investors, using their technological know-how, 
their funds and their managerial expertise, tend to carry out 
restructuring more fully than local investors and thus would 
lead to improvements in the post-privatization performance 
of privatized firms (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). 
Finally, foreign participation has the additional benefit that 
it can impose high information disclosure standards and an 
efficient corporate governance in privatized firms (Dyck, 
2001). Hence, we expect that more foreign direct investment 
in the country will contribute to enhance privatization efforts 
by local governments. FDI will also create more inflows for 
governments willing to privatize through SIPs because the 
more open is the economy to foreign investment the better 
are the institutional framework and the protection of private 
property rights that facilitate stock market transactions 
(Perotti and Oijen, 2001). This discussion leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
H1A: FDI has a positive impact on privatization 
proceeds, everything else being equal.
H1B: FDI has a positive impact on the proportion of 
share issue privatizations in the total number of privatizations 
transactions, everything being equal. 
 The literature also identifies several determinants of 
FDI: Li and Resnick (2003, p.203) argue that with respect 
to foreign direct investment: “While increasing levels of 
democracy help to produce better judicial systems and rule 
of law, these higher levels of democracy also drive foreign 
investors away by imposing constraints on foreign capital 
and the host government.” More law and order means a 
more predictable regulatory environment, less prone to 
unexpected reversals, and therefore a more transparent 
policymaking process.
In addition, financial liberalization is also a determinant 
of FDI. Financial liberalization is a reform that allows 
foreign investors to invest, without particular restrictions, 
in the domestic market, and allows domestic investors to 
trade freely on international financial markets. The recent 
liberalization reforms in emerging markets resulted in an 
increased presence of foreign investors that bring their 
funds, stricter disclosure rules, accounting transparency and 
new management and governance skills (Bekaert, Harvey 
and Lundblad, 2005).
Market-related variables such as GDP, GDP per capita 
(wealth or economic development) and GDP growth also 
constitute traditional FDI determinants (see, for example, 
Schneider and Frey (1985), Wheeler and Mody (1992) 
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and Tsai (1994)). Trade liberalization which measures the 
extent of openness of the country to foreign trade is also 
shown to be positively related to FDI flows. 
In addition to these classic determinants of FDI, we 
consider the impact of privatization. Indeed, when one of 
the governments’ objectives is to attract FDI, it requires 
that a credible environment of contract enforcement, and 
transparency is put in place. Privatization can provide the 
government with such a credible signal. Following Perotti 
(1995), this is particularly true in the case of a share issue 
privatization (unlike private sales). Thus, Perotti’s model 
suggests that gradual sales, with an immediate transfer 
of control, signal that the government is ready to assume 
residual policy risk and that it does not intend to alter the 
value of newly privatized firms through a future change in 
economic policies. Therefore, share issue privatizations 
should signal commitment to investors whose increased 
confidence should attract FDI flows. 1 This discussion leads 
to the following hypotheses:
H2A: Privatization proceeds have a positive impact on 
FDI, everything else being equal.
H2B: The proportion of share issue privatizations in 
the total number of privatization transactions has a positive 
impact on FDI, everything being equal.
Variables, empirical Approach and Sample
Variables
FDI is measured by FDI as a share of GDP from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) database. We measure 
privatization with (1) Privatization proceeds to annual GDP 
per country (PRIVPROC). This ratio measures the volume 
of the country’s privatization and captures the government 
commitment towards market reforms and privatization 
(Perotti and van Oijen, 2001). This ratio is a measure of the 
willingness of governments to privatize and of the economic 
impact of one country’s privatization (Bortolotti, Fantini 
and Siniscalco, 2003). We use the number of share issue 
privatizations (SIPs) to the total number of privatizations 
in the country (PRIVMETH) to capture the method of 
privatization and the willingness of governments to use the 
stock market as a source of financing (Bortolotti, Fantini 
and Siniscalco, 2003). Privatization measures come from 
SDC Thomson Financial.
The determinants of FDI encompass institutional and 
macroeconomic variables. The first ones include law and 
order from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
Other variables such as GDP per capita, and trade open-
ness come from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database, while the degree of liberalization is drawn from 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
As for the determinants of privatization, the measures 
of Budget Balance come from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), measures of Total Debt come from WDI, 
while political orientation comes from the Database of 
Political Institutions of the World Bank, and Legal Origin 
is drawn from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998).
Empirical Approach
To investigate the (possibly) reinforcing link between 
both phenomena, privatization and globalization, we rely 
on a GMM-system estimation technique in a dynamic panel 
setting. Exploiting the information in both dimensions, 
cross-sectional (across countries) and time-series, provides 
a more efficient estimation of the parameters since 
panel data create more variability, through combining 
variation across countries with variation over time, while 
lessening multicollinearity problems (Baltagi, 2001). 
The approach also allows us to control for the problems 
of joint endogeneity of the independent variables (reverse 
causality and simultaneity) and country heterogeneity (i.e., 
unobserved country-specific effects) (Arellano and Bond, 
1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
Specifically, we are concerned with finding empirical 
evidence which would support the hypothesis of the two-
way relation running from foreign direct investment flows 
to privatization and vice-versa. Therefore, we make use of 
an empirical strategy which does account for simultaneity 
bias arising from possible reverse causality between both 
phenomena in a dynamic panel data set. To tackle this 
issue, we resort to the dynamic panel-data estimation, two-
step system GMM following Blundell and Bond (1998), 
which achieves efficiency gains by exploiting the whole 
information contained in the data set, making use not only 
of the regressions in differences but also the regressions in 
levels. For each type of regression, a series of instrumental 
variables are generated to address endogeneity problems 
which are lagged values of the endogenous and exogenous 
variables for the regressions in differences while the lagged 
differences are used in the regressions in levels. 
From an overall stand, the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) first introduced by Hansen (1982) in a time-
series framework and later extended by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) to deal with dynamic panel data sets is an estimation 
procedure that does not require the knowledge of the data 
generating process to produce valid inferences. By making 
1. As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the case of Russia that 
at the same time nationalizes its oil industry and draws high levels of 
FDI flows does not seem to support our hypotheses that privatization 
and FDI are mutual determinants. However, experiences of foreign 
firms operating in Russia vary with the industrial sector markedly 
(Kaartermo, 2007). Indeed, the faster FDI growth in the non-sensitive 
(non-strategic) industries (e.g., retail and wholesale trade, production 
of consumer goods) compensates for the lowering FDI in the sensitive 
industries (e.g., oil and gas industries, telecommunications) where poli-
tical interference and state ownership are pervasive.).
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fewer distributional assumptions on the data generating 
process, the GMM methodology is widely applicable to a 
great variety of fields (finance, macroeconomics, …). 
Following Windmeijer (2005), we also implement the 
finite-sample corrected standard errors for the efficient two-
step GMM estimator throughout the procedure. Without 
this correction, the two-step GMM standard errors are 
known to be severely biased downwards leading thereby to 
mechanically low p-values. 
However, the consistency of the GMM estimator hinges 
on the hypotheses that the instruments are valid and that 
the error terms are not serially correlated. To test both 
hypotheses, we run two specification tests, one proposed 
by Hansen (1982) and the other one proposed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991). The first test, known as the J test, is a 
test of over-identifying restrictions which tests the validity 
of the instruments by checking whether the orthogonality 
conditions are satisfied. If this is the case, the J statistic 
should be close to 0 supporting the hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid. In other words, our model specification 
is adequate if we cannot reject the null hypothesis of over-
identifying restrictions. The second tests the null hypothesis 
that the error termεi,t is not serially correlated. The test 
examines whether the difference error term,
 
Δεi,t has second 
order serial autocorrelation. The non-rejection of the null 
hypotheses supports our model. 
To identify the impact of the privatization on the flows 
of foreign direct investment and reciprocally, it is necessary 
to control for some effects already pined down in the 
literature. Thus the design for our panel data analysis will 
incorporate the influence of the other factors as follows.
For the foreign direct investment (FDI) flows equation 
we consider:
FDIit = rFDIit-1 + ß1PRIV + ß2LIBERit-1+ ß3TRADEit-1 + 
ß4GDPCit-1 + ß5LAW _AND _ORDERit-1 + μi + εit
and for the privatization equation:
PRIVit = rPRIVit-1 + ß1FDIit + ß2DEBTit-1 + ß3BUDGETBAL it-1 
+ ß4LEGALit-1 + ß5POLITOit-1 + μi + εit
with i denoting the country (i=1, … ,N) and t the time index 
(t=1, …, T) for yearly observations; μi will account for the 
unobserved country-specific effect.
The foreign direct investment is measured as the 
logarithm of the ratio of inflows and outflows to the GDP.2 
We consider two different measures of privatization:
(1) We rely on the logarithm of the ratio of privatization 
proceeds to the GDP as a measure of the volume of 
privatization (PRIVPROC); we expect a positive relation 
between this variable and FDI;
(2) to capture the method of privatization and the 
willingness of the government to use the stock market as a 
source of financing we rely on the logarithm of the ratio of 
the number of share issue privatizations to the total number 
of privatization transactions (PRIVMETH); we expect a 
positive relation between this variable and FDI;
The control variables for the FDI equation are the 
following ones:
(1) the trade openness is measured as the logarithm of 
the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a 
share of GDP; the more a country is open and integrated 
into the world economy, the greater the likelihood for the 
country to attract FDI (+);
(2) the logarithm of the GDP per capita is a proxy for 
the level of economic development or wealth; the larger the 
level of economic development, the higher the propensity 
of the country to attract FDI (+);
(3) the index of intensity of financial liberalization as 
defined by Bekaert, Harvey and Lunblad (2005); financial 
liberalization reforms tend to increase the presence of 
foreign investors as the latter can exchange freely without 
any restrictions (+);
(4) the index of Law and Order which comes from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) is measured 
on a scale from 0 to 6 (the best outcome); the more law 
and order in the country, the more predictable regulatory 
environment, the less prone to unexpected reversals, the 
more the government commits itself to protecting the 
investors and hence the greater the likelihood to attract FDI 
(+)
The control variables for the privatization equation are 
the following ones:
(1) a measure of the logarithm of the total (foreign 
and domestic) indebtedness as a percentage of the GDP 
since financial distressed governments are more likely to 
privatize (+),
(2) a measure of fiscal deficit (government cash surplus/ 
deficit) as a percentage of the GDP
(-),
(3) a dummy variable for the legal environment since, 
in contrast to common law countries, civil law countries are 
not strong advocates of investor protection and therefore 
less prone to privatize,
(4) a dummy variable for the political orientation of the 
2. Note that we use a loglinear model, also known as a constant elas-
ticity form which does not vary with the explanatory variable (Greene, 
2003). For instance, in the loglinear model 1n y = ß1 + ß2 1n x + ε 
ß2 measures the percentage in y associated with a one percentage 
change in x. This removes the units of measurement of the variable 
from consideration in using the regression model (Greene, 2003, p. 123) 
together with providing a useful interpretation in terms of elasticity.
86 Management international / International Management / Gestión Internacional, 13(2)
government since a right-wing government (outcome=1) is 
more likely to privatize than a left-wing government (out-
come=0).
Sample Description
Our sample consists of 31 developing countries and 
22 developed countries over the period 1984 to 2005, 
with yearly observations. The list and the definition of the 
variables as well as their data sources appear in Table 1.
We note that foreign direct investment flows were more 
important at the end of the 1990s, beginning of 2000s 
(between 1997 and 2002). They smoothly increased in 
the mid-nineties to sharply peak at the end of the century. 
Developed countries were the most attractive with respect to 
FDI, headed by North European countries such as Belgium, 
Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom and France as the hard core but also 
followed by Singapore in the East Asian region. Developing 
countries did also benefit from FDI, among which Chile, 
Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica are striking examples. 
Regarding privatization proceeds, they started to increase 
smoothly before peaking sharply in 1997 and 1998, right at 
the onset of the Asian Crisis. Privatization proceeds remain 
intensive despite a slight slowing down in 2003. Countries 
which did benefit more from privatization in terms of 
tAbleAU 1
definitions, proxies and data sources
Variable Proxy Label Expected 
sign Source
Foreign direct investment Ratio of inflows and outflows to 
the GDP (in log)
FDI IMF data base
Privatization proceeds
Method of Privatization
Log of the annual privatization 
proceeds to GDP
Log of the number of 
privatizations by share issues to 
the total number of privatizations
PRIVPROC
PRIVMETH
 +
+
SDC Platinium, 
Thomson Financial
International Financial 
Statistics
Trade openness
Level of wealth
Financial liberalization
Law and Order
Log of the sum of imports and 
exports of good and services
Log of the GDP per Capita based 
on purchasing power parity, in 
current international US$
Index measuring the degree 
of openness as the number of 
investment restrictions imposed 
on entry in the local stock market. 
Index=0 for a closed market and 
index=1 for fully open market. 
(Bekaert et al. 2005)
Assessment of the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system 
and of popular observance
TRADE
GDPC
LIBER
Law and Order
+
+
+
+
World Development 
Indicator (WDI)
International Finance 
Corporation
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG)
Total debt
Budget Balance
Log of the total debt(domestic 
and foreign) as a share of GDP
Cash surplus/deficit as a share of 
GDP
DEBT
BUDGETBAL
+
-
World Development 
Indicators (WDI)
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS)
Legal Origin
Political Orientation
Dummy that is equal to one if the 
legal origin is common law, and 
zero otherwise
Dummy that is equal to one for a 
right-wing government
LEGAL
POLITO
+
+
La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998)
Database on Political 
Institutions (WORLD 
BANK)
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proceeds are the Philippines, Trinidad & Tobago, Brazil, 
Jamaica among developing countries, and Denmark and 
Finland among developed countries. Thus privatizations 
contributed substantially to drain revenues toward 
developing countries. Regarding share issue privatizations, 
the evolution of this indicator is quite erratic through time 
with pikes between 1994 and 1996 and in 2004. Developing 
countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Malaysia, South Korea, 
Tunisia, Ecuador and Jordan did resort to the stock market 
in the mid-nineties to transfer ownership rights. During the 
same years, Ireland and Japan did also make use of the stock 
market to privatize. In 2004, the important players in this 
area are Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil, Peru, and Jamaica. 
empirical Results
Impact of FDI on Privatization
Table 4 presents the results of the regression of the 
logarithm of privatization proceeds to GDP (PRIVPROC) 
on the logarithm of FDI (FDI). First, we observe that the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is significant 
at all conventional levels (p value=0.000). Consequently, a 
dynamic specification for the privatization equation helps 
us to understand the evolution of this phenomenon across 
time. Second, we note that the FDI coefficient is significant 
at the 5% level (p value=0.015). Therefore our results 
support our first hypothesis (H1A) that foreign direct 
tAbleAU 2
Sample of privatizing countries
Panel A: Developing Countries
Argentina
Bangladesh
Brazil
Cameroon
Chile
Colombia
Cote d’Ivoire
Ecuador
Egypt
Ghana
India
Indonesia
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
South Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
Panel B: Developed Countries
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
tAbleAU 3
descriptives statistics (panel A)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI
PRIVPROC
PRIVMETH
TRADE
LIBER
LAW AND ORDER
GDPC
DEBT
BUDGETBAL
LEGAL
POLITO
1042
1076
700
1140
900
1160
1165
880
779
880
819
1.202556
.2132306
.1402257
4.028233
.685
4.042349
8.353014
2.033206
-5.285532
.4545455
.3199023
.8035513
.3688746
.1954829
.5385985
.4252494
1.652064
1.578863
1.917634
27.47681 
.4982128
.4667235
-1.854664
0
0
2.591217
0
0
5.019722
0
-336.3994
0
0
5.210179
2.202567
.6931472
6.124876
1
6
11.06702
5.252699
48.00256
1
1
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investment flows have a positive impact on privatization 
proceeds. More specifically, an increase of 1% of foreign 
direct investments entails a 66% increase of privatization 
proceeds3. With regard to the debt factors, we find that 
budget imbalances provide strong incentives to trigger 
privatization in order to fill in the empty coffers of the State, 
as already pined down in Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco 
(2003). The coefficient is negative and strongly significant 
(with a p value =0.000). The effect from total debt is less 
pronounced (with a p value=0.073) than the one from the 
fiscal deficit which appears to be the major determinant 
in this context. As for the dummy variables, the results 
do not provide evidence that common law countries that 
protect investors’ rights better and the political orientation 
of the privatizing government (right-wing versus left-wing) 
affect privatization proceeds since both variables are not 
significant at a conventional level. 
With regard to the method of privatization, we find 
that privatization reforms draw foreign investors when the 
stock market is involved since the positive impact of FDI 
on the number of share issue privatizations is significant at 
the 10% level (with a p value=0.078). These results support 
our (H1B) hypothesis. Indeed, an increase of 1% of FDI 
translates into an 87% increase of share issue privatizations4. 
As for the lagged variable, it is not too surprising to find 
that its predictive power is relatively low (with a p-value= 
0.146). Indeed, it is difficult for the market to show any 
sign of memory with such a short time span and market-
tAbleAU 3
descriptives statistics by years (panel b)
Year Statistic FDI PRIVPROC PRIVMETH Year Statistic FDI PRIVPROC  PRIVMETH
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
.6122
.5170
.6543
.5560
.7216
.5887
.8174
.6075
.8695
.6649
1.0445
.6840
1.0003
.6560
.9352
.6295
.8913
.6737
1.1434
.5903
1.2737
.6784
1.2159
.6334
1.2592
.6617
1.4455
.6525
1.6345
.7954
1.8066
1.0131
.00029
.00205
.00009
.00045
.0228
.1326
.0202
.0582
.0500
.1243
.1220
.3467
.1699
.3965
.1680
.3569
.2080
.3044
.2905
.3477
.3664
.4856
.3068
.3114
.3305
.3417
.4738
.5287
.4329
.4387
.3106
.3774
0
.
.2027
.2867
.0308
.0689
.07985
.1316
.0929
.2307
.1016
.2112
.0822
.1668
.1166
.2066
.1594
.2075
.2376
.1919
.16234
.16239
.1835
.2179
.1604
.2262
.1059
.1806
.1155
.1731
.1619
.2221
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
MEAN
STD
1.9882
1.0599
1.6080
.9322
1.4415
.7523
1.4173
.7104
1.3116
.7991
1.6497
.7546
.3437
.4726
.2446
.4558
.2455
.3643
.2008
.3446
.2047
.2904
.2058
.3573
.1428
.1927
.0903
.1690
.1371
.1877
.1342
.1797
.1597
.2107
.0688
.1256
3. (0,01)0,0893926 = 0,6625
4. (0,01)0,0298082 = 0,8717
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through privatizations happening so infrequently. The 
variables related to debt and deficits are not significant even 
though the significance of the fiscal imbalances is close to 
10% (with a p value = 0.110). Meanwhile, the legal origin 
variable is significant at the 5% level (p-value 0.042) and 
supports the hypothesis that the legal origin is an important 
determinant of share issue privatization. In this respect, 
the law and finance literature has shown that French civil 
law countries tend to be associated with a poor minority 
shareholder protection. Legal protection does matter when 
one issues shares to transfer ownership rights.
Then, we check if the model is well specified by 
performing the tests proposed by Hansen (1982) for the 
validity of the instruments and the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) test of autocorrelations in the residuals. The results 
shown in Table 4 suggest that the Hansen J test cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that our instruments are appropriate. 
The Arellano and Bond test for the autocorrelation in the 
residuals in differences should find spurious autocorrelation 
of order 1 and no sign of autocorrelation of order 2 in the 
first differences. The Arellano and Bond test cannot reject 
(at the 5% significance level) the null hypothesis that there 
is no second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. In this 
respect, the output in Table 4 provides no evidence that 
the model is misspecified at the 1% and 5% conventional 
levels.
Impact of Privatization on FDI
Table 5 presents the results of the regression of the 
logarithm of FDI (FDI) on the logarithm of privatization 
proceeds to GDP (PRIVPROC). We note that the PRIVPROC 
coefficient is significant at the conventional level of 5% (p 
value = 0.019). Therefore, our results do support our (H2A) 
hypothesis that contemporaneous privatization proceeds 
have a positive and significant impact on foreign direct 
investment flows. More specifically, an increase of 1% in 
privatization proceeds entails a 40% increase of foreign 
direct investments. 5 In addition, we note that the presence 
tAbleAU 4
impact of Fdi on privatization
This table presents, for the whole sample, the results of the regressions in dynamic panel estimated with a system GMM 
procedure as in Blundell and Bond (1998) for the period 1984-2005. The privatization (PRIVPROC/PRIVMETH) model 
is as follows: 
PRIVit = rPRIVit-1 + ß1FDIit + ß2DEBTit-1 + ß3BUDGETBAL it-1 + ß4LEGALit-1 + ß5POLITOit-1 + μi + εit
Variable Expected 
sign Coefficient
Robust 
Standard 
Error
T p-value
PRIVPROC-L
FDI
DEBT
BUDGETBAL
LEGAL
POLITO
A-B test for AR(1)
A-B test for AR(2)
Hansen J test
Number of observations = 510
+
+
+
-
+
.3090969
.0893926
.0165211
-.0011787
-.043784
.0356458
 .0633383
.0352359
.0089702
.0003061
.037602
.0317841
4.88
2.54
1.84
-3.85
-1.16
1.12
-3.15
1.94 
0.000
0.015
0.073
0.000
0.252
0.269
0.002
0.053
1.000
PRIVMETH-L
FDI
DEBT
BUDGETBAL
LEGAL
POLITO
A-B test for AR(1)
A-B test for AR(2)
Hansen J test
Number. of observations =363
+
+
+
-
+
+
.1521399
.0298082
.0070089
-.0004641
.0500508
.0270264
.1023873
.0164611
.0055219
.000283
.0237547
.0220987
1.49
1.81
1.27
-1.64
2.11
1.22
-3.07
0.69
0.146
0.078
0.212
0.110
0.042
0.229
0.002
0.492
1.000
5. (0,01)0,1989593 = 0,40
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of recent foreign investments encourages new FDI through 
a positive significant coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable (p value = 0.000), which supports the choice of 
a dynamic specification for the FDI equation. In order to 
disentangle the effects of the sole privatization proceeds 
onto FDI from side-benefits, we incorporate some control 
variables into the specification. The results bring to light the 
importance of trade openness (p value = 0.005) and level of 
wealth (p value =0.018) for foreign investors, all of which 
make the economic environment friendlier together with 
profitable market growth opportunities. However, both the 
coefficients of the law and order variable and the financial 
liberalization index are not significant at conventional 
levels. 
We further perform specification tests to check the 
validity of the model. The results shown in Table 5 do not 
provide evidence that the model is misspecified. With regard 
to the Hansen J test, the p value reported is arbitrarily close 
to 1 and does not question the exogeneity of the instruments. 
We also cannot reject (at the 5 % significance level) the null 
hypothesis that there is no second-order correlation in the 
residuals which supports our model specification.
With regard to the method of privatization measured by 
PRIVMETH, the results do not seem to support the (H2B) 
hypothesis that privatization through the stock market 
should boost FDI. A look at the World Bank database on 
privatization transactions shows that foreign investment is 
often associated with private sales of former state-owned 
firms, to foreign investors. Nevertheless, we should be 
circumspect about drawing any conclusive remark, to the 
extent that this dearth of evidence in favour of the (H2B) 
hypothesis may be attributed to a large number of missing 
values for PRIVMETH.
concluding remarks
In this paper, we examine the link between foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and privatization of state-owned 
enterprises in a multi-country sample that includes both 
developed and developing countries. We hypothesize that 
privatization has an effect on FDI as the process of fostering 
private sector participation often involved the allocations of 
substantial shares to foreign investors in newly privatized 
firms. Similarly, we expect FDI to foster privatization 
tAbleAU 5
impact of privatization on Fdi
This table presents, for the whole sample, the results of the regressions in dynamic panel estimated with a system GMM 
procedure as in Blundell and Bond (1998) for the period 1984-2005. The FDI model is as follows:
FDIit = rFDIit-1 + ß1PRIV + ß2LIBERit-1+ ß3TRADEit-1 + ß4GDPCit-1 + ß5LAW _AND _ORDERit-1 + μi + εit
Variable Expected 
sign Coefficient
Robust 
Standard 
Error
T p-value
FDI-L
PRIVPROC
LIBER
TRADE
GDPC
LAW AND ORDER
A-B test for AR(1)
A-B test for AR(2)
Hansen J test
Number of observations = 781 
+
+
+
+
+
+
.6451673
.1989593
.0203502
.1467477
.0466939
.0027789
.0662044
.0818513
.0695516
.0497719
.0190848
.015994
9.75
2.43
0.29
2.95
2.45
0.17
-3.56
0.52 
0.000
0.019
0.771
0.005
0.018
0.863
0.000
0.600
1.000
FDI-L
PRIVMETH
LIBER
TRADE
GDPC
LAW AND ORDER
A-B test for AR(1)
A-B test for AR(2)
Hansen J test
Number of observations = 572
+
+
+
+
+
+
.6161758
.0858217
-.018648
.1835041
.0652761
-.00012
.0544696
.1570865
.067852
.0552776
.0304999
.0182926
11.31
0.55
-0.27
3.32
2.14
-0.01
-3.06
0.23
0.000
0.588
0.785
0.002
0.038
0.995
0.002
0.816
1.000
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efforts as new capital inflows, technology and managerial 
skills that accompany FDI make the environment more 
prone to competition, and provide governments with a good 
environment to privatize inefficient firms that need to be 
turned around. We do find some empirical evidence that there 
is a two-way relation running from FDI to privatization and 
vice versa. The link is strong when we measure privatization 
with the proceeds from these transactions to GDP. It 
seems to be more difficult to identify the link connecting 
FDI to the number of share issue privatizations mostly 
because of a limited data set. However, in the light of these 
results, we advance that there does exist a bi-directional 
relation between these two major phenomena of the last 
twenty years. Thus by improving the investment climate, 
privatization contributes in attracting investors, domestic 
and foreign alike, and contributes to enhance the growth 
and development process. A policy implication of our study 
is that privatization programs in an economic environment 
that is investment-friendly contribute to draw foreign 
investors who will bring the capital flows, technology and 
managerial skills that are needed to turn around inefficient 
firms. Another policy implication of this study is that share 
issue privatization is more likely to be successful in countries 
where the legal system protects shareholders’ rights, that is 
a common law system rather than a civil law system. From 
the FDI perspective, FDI flows have accompanied and 
responded positively to government privatization programs. 
The intensity of the privatization programs seems to have 
been strengthened by massive increases in FDI flows which 
continued to increase throughout the 2000s. It is thus no 
surprise that several privatization transactions on the stock 
market involved the sale of a tranche directly aimed at 
foreign investors. Thus both phenomena, the worldwide 
launching of privatization programs and FDI flows seem to 
have a reinforcing dynamic.
To our knowledge, ours is the first multinational empirical 
study on the bi-directional relation between privatization 
and FDI flows. The evidence we provide on such a relation, 
particularly strong in the case of the privatization proceeds, 
is new but it should be viewed as preliminary for different 
reasons. First, we show that there is a bi-directional relation 
between privatization and foreign direct investment flows but 
we do not provide a direct causality test between these two 
phenomena. The main objective of the present study was to 
shed light on the existence of such a link in a relatively simple 
methodological setup. A thorough examination of such a 
relation requires a more elaborated statistical framework 
that is specifically designed for conducting causality tests 
(e.g., Granger and instantaneous causality tests that require 
a vector autoregressive model in a panel setting (Chong and 
Gradstein, 2007)). These empirical tests go beyond the scope 
of this paper and will be left for future research. Second, we 
could complement our study of the bi-directional relation 
between privatization and FDI by investigating the link 
between privatization and international portfolio flows. 
Indeed, share issue privatizations that are open to foreign 
investors are likely to drain foreign portfolio flows as well. 
Likewise, countries with more developed local capital 
markets that attract these flows by foreign investors are 
likely to privatize more extensively. The analysis of the bi-
directional relation between privatization and international 
portfolio flows also deserves a thorough investigation.
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